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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This case arises from the District Court's denial of Stephen Kingsley's Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus, which alleged that the Idaho Department of Correction's ("IDOC")
recommendation for treatment through the Sex Offender Treatment Program ("SOTP") violated
his Constitutional rights as stated in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Neal v. Shimada, 131 F.3d
818 (9th Cir. 1997).

For the following reasons, this Court should affirm and uphold the

dismissal because Kingsley's arguments are without merit.
B.

Procedural Background

Kingsley filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on May 22, 2013, against the IDOC
and Randy Blades, the warden at Idaho State Correctional Institution. Vol. L pp. 14-24. The
underlying Petition alleged that IDOC was "illegally enhancing" his sentence by "forcing" him
to participate in the SOTP. Id.

The underlying grievances filed by Kingsley related to his

assigned "Pathway." 1 Vol. I, p. 36. The district comi ordered that Respondent Blades and
IDOC 2 reply on June 7, 2013. Vol. I, pp. 30-31. IDOC responded to the Petition by filing a
motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. Vol. I, pp. 32-124.
The motion argued that ( 1) treatment programs are voluntary and not required by IDOC,

A Pathway is a treatment recommendation made by IDOC for each individual offender.
As noted in the District Court's Order to respond, pursuant to Idaho Code § I9-4205(5), IDOC was an improperly
named party. J.C. § 19-4205(5) ("Neither the state of Idaho, any of this political subdivisions, or any of its agencies,
nor any private correctional facility shall be named as respondents in a prisoner petition for writ of habeas corpus.").
Kingsley does not name IDOC as part of this appeal.
1

2
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therefore, Kingsley was not "forced" to participate in his Pathway; (2) Kingsley had prior sex
offenses and, therefore, sex offender treatment was appropriate; and (3) there is no constitutional
right to parole and attendance in SOTP would not affect Kingsley's full term release date. Vol.

I., pp. 35-124. IDOC supported its Motion with the Affidavit of Dr. Richard Craig, which
demonstrated that Kingsley's assigned Pathway was appropriate pursuant to IDOC policy. Vol.
I, pp. 35-97. IDOC subsequently supplemented its Motion with documents that it had requested

from Ada County for the Court to take judicial notice, including, a 1986 sex offense committed
by Kingsley and Kingsley's plea agreement for his current incarceration. Vol. I, pp. 106-124.
IDOC noted in its Supplemental Memorandum that Kingsley had agreed to undergo a
psychosexual evaluation as part of his plea agreement for his current incarceration. Id.
After time for briefing, the Court entered an order dismissing Kingsley's Petition. Vol. I.,

pp. 149-154. The comi dismissed Kingsley's Petition because his constitutional rights were not
violated through the recommendation for the SOTP because Kingsley's current incarceration
arose from a sex-based offense and his prior conviction for Lewd Conduct with a Minor. The
court also addressed Kingsley's argument that there was "no sexual connotation" to his current
incarceration by noting that the sentencing judge specifically addressed during sentencing that
(1) the original charge related to sexual contact with a developmentally disabled child; (2) the
agreement to undergo a psychosexual evaluation was part of the plea agreement; and (3) the
results of the psychosexual evaluation found that Kingsley was "at a high risk to reoffend and he
was not amenable to treatment." Vol. I, pp. 151-152. The court found that Kingsley's rights
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were not violated by IDOC's recommendation that he attend a SOTP. This appeal followed.

Vol. I, pp. 164-167.

C.

Factual Background
Kingsley has a long history of incarceration, including two sex-based offenses. Vol. I.,

pp. 99-100. In 1986, Kingsley was convicted of Lewd Conduct with a Minor. Id. Currently,
Kingsley's incarceration relates to an original charge of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct where it
was alleged that he had sexual contact with a developmentally disabled child. Id,· Vol. I, p. I 5 I.
Kingsley pied guilty to the lesser charge of Injury to a Child, and entered into a plea agreement
where he agreed to undergo a psychosexual evaluation.

Vol. I., pp. 99-100, I 19.

His

psychosexual evaluation found that he was at a high risk to reoffend and that Kingsley was not
amenable to treatment. Vol. I., p. I 5 I.
Upon entry to IDOC custody, Kingsley, was assigned a recommended treatment program,
known as a Pathway. Vol. I., p. JOO. In accordance with IDOC policy, a Pathway is based on a
number of items, including "Anti-social and pro-criminal attitudes, values, beliefs, and
cognitive-emotional states[;] Criminal associates and isolation from pro-social others[;]
Temperament and personality factors conductive to criminal activity, such as psychopathy,
impulsivity, egocentrism, or risk-taking[;] Weak problem-solving skills[;] History of anti-social
behavior[;] Family factors[;] Low levels of education, vocational, or financial achievement[;
and] Substance abuse[.]" Vol. I., p. 160. The purpose of a Pathway is to aid an inmate with
his/her transition back into society. Vol. I, p. I 00. Kingsley was assigned to Pathway 11, which
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is part of the SOTP. Id. Kingsley's Pathway was based on his Static 99R score, 3 his current and
prior convictions, and the other criteria identified above. Id.
Participation in an IDOC Pathway is purely voluntary. Id. An inmate's full-term release
date is not affected by an offender's choice to participate in programming. However, the parole
commission may consider programming prior to granting parole, but is not bound by any
treatment recommendations made by IDOC.

IDAPA 50.01.01.250.01.

In other words, the

parole commission may consider participation in programming, but participation in
programming does not guarantee parole. Kingsley is parole eligible in May 2014. 4 Vol. I, p.
100.

D.

Issues on Appeal
Petitioner Kingsley presents the following issues on appeal:
1. Whether the District Court committed reversible enor by dismissing Kingsley's

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 5
2. Whether the District Court erred by holding that the Parole Board and the Board of
Correction were improperly named parties.
Respondent Blades raises the following additional issues on appeal:
3. Whether Randy Blades is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal.

The Static 99R score is utilized in accordance with !DOC policy and is "[a] specific sex offender risk assessment
instrument that (a) contains the four (4) Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offense Recidivism (RRASOR) items
and six (6) additional items, and (b) yields separate long-term probabilities for sexual and/or violent re-offense
risks." Vol. I, p. JOO.
4 At the time of Kingsley's Petition, parole had not been granted or denied.
5 To avoid repetition of argument, Kingsley's first, third, and fourth issue on appeal are consolidated into this single
issue.
3
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II.
ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review
"[T]he decision to issue a writ of habeas corpus is within the trial court's discretion."

Drennon v. Craven, 141 Idaho 34, 36, 105 P.3d 694, 696 (2004). In an appeal from a summary
judgment dismissing a habeas corpus petition, the appellate court is bound by the same standard
of review as the trial court. See Freeman v. Idaho Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 872, 875, 71 P.3d
471, 474 (Ct. App. 2003). Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Hays v. State,
132 Idaho 516,519,975 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Ct. App. 1999). "When assessing summary judgment
on a habeas co1pus petition, we treat all uncontroverted allegations in the petition as true, and we
liberally construe all controverted facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party." See Id.; see also Freeman, 138 Idaho at 875, 71 P.3d at 474.
The Court is generally not "concerned with the truth or falsity of petitioner's allegations
[in an application for writ of habeas corpus]. . .. in examining the sufficiency of a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, all allegations set forth therein must be accepted as being true." Mahaffey

v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 230, 392 P.2d 279, 280 (1964).

The writ of habeas corpus is a

constitutional right in Idaho. Idaho Constitution, Article 1, §5. "Although the legislature has
made and provided reasonable regulation for its use (LC. §§ 19-4201 through 19-4236), the writ
is not a statutory remedy, but rather a remedy recognized and protected by the Idaho
Constitution." Mahcif.Jey, 87 Idaho at 231, 392 P.2d at 280. "[T]o entitle the applicant to the
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writ, there must be at least a prima facie showing in the application that the detention or
confinement is unlawful." Mitchell v. Idaho, 105 Idaho 419, 422, 670 P.2d 520, 523 (1983)
(quoting 39 Am.Jur.2d 267, § 123).
B.

Argument on Appeal

1.

The District Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When it Dismissed
Kingsley's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

The district com1 did not abuse its discretion when it correctly found that the SOTP and
the assigned Pathway given to Kingsley did not violate Kingsley's constitutional rights. The
district court summarized its decision by stating:
[T]here is no genuine issue of material fact that the petitioner's Injury to a Child
conviction was a crime with sexual connotations, as was his prior Lewd Conduct
conviction, and, if the petitioner desires to be paroled, the department possesses
the authority to consider his criminal history and his rehabilitation progress, in
evaluating whether or not he should be paroled.

Vol. I, pp. 152-153 (internal citations to IDAPA 50.01.01.250.0l(a)-(c) and United States v.
Thomas, 212 Fed.Appx. 483, 488 (6th Cir. 2007) omitted). This finding is correct. As outlined
above, Kingsley was originally charged with Lewd and Lascivious Conduct and he pled guilty to
the lesser charge of Injury to a Child and agreed to undergo a psychosexual evaluation. His
charges related to allegations that he sexually assaulted a developmentally disabled girl and
provided her with alcohol or drugs. Kingsley also has a 1986 conviction for Lewd Conduct with
a Minor. IDOC's recommendation that Kingsley participate in the SOTP is proper based on
appropriate factors, including his prior sex-based offenses.
Kingsley's agreement to undergo a psychosexual evaluation is conclusive evidence that
he agreed to the treatment recommendations that would be made based on that evaluation.
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Kingsley argues that the psychosexual evaluation was only "to be used to make a determination
as to whether or not he was able to be placed on a 'Ryder'[.]" Opening Brief c?JAppellant, p. 3.
Such an argument is without merit. Kingsley cannot agree to a psychosexual evaluation for only
the benefit that it may confer upon him through the rider program; instead, he is subject to the
risk that the evaluation may provide unfavorable results as well.

In this instance it did and

Kingsley has been determined to be at a high risk to reoffend.
Kingsley relies on Neal v. Shimada, to support his argument that he is suffering from an
"atypical and significant hardship" during incarceration through his assigned Pathway. See Neal

v. Shimada, 131 F.3d 818,831 (9th Cir. 1997). In Neal, the Ninth Circuit found that an inmate
cannot be forced to participate in a SOTP if the inmate was not afforded due process prior to
being affixed with the "sex offender" label. See Neal, 131 F .3d at 831. However, the Court
carefully drew a distinction between offenders that were validly convicted of a sex-based offense
and inmates that were merely charged with a sex-based offense. See Id In other words, if an
inmate had a conviction for a sex-based offense or pied guilty to a sex-based offense, then the
inmate was afforded all his due process rights.

Neal, directly addresses the situation presented in this case.

However, contrary to

Kingsley's argument, the conclusion does not land in Kingsley's favor.

Instead, the Ninth

Circuit's ruling that sex offender treatment programs do not violate constitutional rights as long
as the inmate has a current or prior conviction for a sex-based offense renders IDOC's
recommendation proper because ( 1) Kingsley was previously convicted of Lewd Conduct with a
Minor; and (2) Kingsley is currently incarcerated for Injury to a Child and agreed to undergo a
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psychosexual evaluation. 6 His criminal background for sex-based offenses makes it clear that
the recommendation for SOTP is proper in this instance.
Finally, Kingsley's argument that his failure to comply with the SOTP recommendation
affects his parole date and prolongs his sentence is without merit. First, there is no constitutional
right to parole. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979) ("There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted
person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence."). "The possibility
of parole is not protected by due process." Vittone v. State, 114 Idaho 618,619, 759 P.2d 909,
910 (1988). Next, Kingsley is not parole eligible until May 2014 and the parole commission is
with the full authority to consider all institutional behavior when making a parole decision.
IDAPA 50.01.01.250.01. Although, Kingsley's participation in the SOTP may be considered by
the commission, the commission is not bound by any IDOC recommendation and participation in
recommended programming does not guarantee Kingsley parole. Such an argument does not
extend Kingsley's sentence because there is no constitutional guarantee to early release from
prison prior to the expiration of an offender's sentence.
Based on the foregoing, Kingsley's constitutional rights were not violated by IDOC's
recommendation that he attend the SOTP. The SOTP is purely voluntary and Kingsley may
choose not to attend the program. Kingsley's recommendation for the SOTP is proper based on
Kingsley argues that a misdemeanor offense is different than a felony offense and that his 1986 conviction for
Lewd Conduct with a Minor cannot be considered by IDOC in rendering treatment recommendations. Such
argument is without merit because Neal draws no distinction between a misdemeanor sexual offense and a felony
sexual offense; instead, the focus of Neal is whether the inmate was afforded due process during the proceedings.
Since Kingsley has been convicted of a sex-based offense or agreed to specific terms arising from the charge of a
sex-based offense, Kingsley has been afforded due process prior to the recommendation for the SOTP.
6
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his prior convictions for sex-based offenses. Finally, Kingsley has no constitutional right to the
conditional early release from prison through parole and, therefore, his failure to attend the
SOTP cannot "extend" the length of his sentence. For these reasons, the Court should affim1 the
district court's decision.
2.

The Parole Board and the Board of Correction Were Not Named in the
Habeas Petition and are Improper Parties for that Reason and Pursuant to
the Habeas Corpus and Institutional Litigation Procedures Act

The issue of whether the district court erred in dismissing the Board of Correction and the
parole commission is not properly before this Court because it was not raised by Kingsley in his
original Petition, not argued in any of the briefing, and neither of these entities are named parties
in this matter. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 580, 21 P.3d 895, 902 (2001). However, even if
Kingsley had named the Board of Correction and the Parole Commission, 7 both would be
improperly named parties and subject to dismissal pursuant to the habeas statutes. See I.C. § 194205(5). "Neither the state of Idaho, any of its political subdivisions, or any of its agencies, now
any private correctional facility shall be named as respondents in a prisoner petition for writ of
habeas corpus." Id. For these reasons, the Court should disregard this argument or dismiss this
argument as lacking merit.
3.

Respondent Blades is Entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal

The Court shall award attorney's fees in a habeas corpus action when the petition is
brought frivolously.

LC. § 12-122; I.AR. 41. '"[B]rought frivolously,' shall mean that the

As noted above, Kingsley did name the !DOC as a party to his original Petition. Therefore, it is possible that
Kingsley intended to appeal the dismissal of !DOC and inadve1tently named the parole commission and the Board of
Correction. However, even if Kingsley named the wrong entities through inadve1tence, !DOC is an improper pa1ty
for the same statutory reasons. See I.C. § 19-4205(5).
7
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petitioner petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus based upon claims which either had no
basis in fact or, even if the factual allegations were true, they did not, as a matter of law, justify
any relief to the petitioner[.]" LC. § 12-122. Respondent Blades requests that this Court award
attorney's fees because this appeal, and the underlying petition, were brought frivolously. See
Swain v. State, 122 Idaho 918, 922, 841 P.2d 448, 452 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Clearly, there is no
language in LC. § 12-122 prohibiting the state from asserting its claim for fees on appeal
independent from a request for attorney fees for defending a frivolous action in the lower court.")
III.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Respondent Blades requests this Comi affirm the
judgment of the district court, dismissing Kingsley's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with
prejudice.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ,:.....1-; day ofNovember, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this i,;l aay of November, 2013, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of the following:

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy:

Stephen J. Kingsley, #15065
ISCI
P.O. Box 14
Boise, ID 83707
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